COMMENTS
THE ETHICS OF MOVING TO DISQUALIFY
OPPOSING COUNSEL FOR CONFLICT
OF INTEREST
A court, in exercise of its inherent powers of supervision,1 may
disqualify counsel found to be in conflict of interest with respect to a
case before the court. When opposing counsel is in a serious conflict of
interest, it is clearly the duty of an attorney to move for disqualification. Some motions to disqualify opposing counsel, however, may be
nothing more than tactical devices to delay the proceedings or to remove opposing counsel, not because of the purported conflict of interest, but because opposing counsel is dangerously competent. In such
cases a motion to disqualify is surely at least prima facie unethical.
This Comment will discuss criteria for distinguishing those situations in
which a motion to disqualify opposing counsel for conflict of interest is
ethically mandatory, ethically permissible, and ethically impermissible.
I.

THE LAW OF DISQUALIFICATION FOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST

While it is beyond the scope of this Comment to discuss the details
of the law of disqualification,2 it is necessary to sketch the general context in which the decision to move to disqualify opposing counsel is
made. In analyzing a conflict of interest situation it is useful to ask
what relations of counsel give rise to the conflict and who stands to be
harmed by that conflict. The relations giving rise to conflicts of interest3
in disqualification cases include personal relations of the attorney,
present representation of a potentially adverse party,4 and prior repreTHE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1978) [hereinafter cited as CODE; Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations therein hereinafter cited only by DR and EC numbers];
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS [hereinafter cited as OPINIONS].
1. In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 1976); Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., 345 F. Supp. 93, 95 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
2. See generaly Liebman, The ChangingLaw of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption

andPolicy, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 996 (1979).
3. See, e.g., Bachman v. Pertschuk, 437 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1977) (counsel also a member
of plaintiff class). See also DR 5-101(A).
4. See, e.g., Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976). See also EC 514, -20; DR 5-105; H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 103-30 (1953).
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sentation of an adverse party.5 Parties who may be injured by the conflict of interest include the present client of the attorney moving to
disqualify opposing counsel, the present client of the attorney who is
the target of the motion, 6 and third parties. The law with respect to
disqualification varies depending on the conflict relation and the potentially harmed party. This Comment will focus on those cases in which
an attorney moves to disqualify opposing counsel because the opponent
previously represented the movant's client or has professional ties to
attorneys who previously represented the movant's client. These cases
are common among the reported disqualification cases, and the ethical
problems this Comment discusses will be more definite in this restricted
setting. The results of the discussion can be fairly easily extended to
other conflict disqualification contexts.
A.

The SubstantialRelationshio Test.

A court may disqualify counsel when the subject matter of a case
bears a "substantial relationship" to a matter in which counsel previously advised or represented the presently adverse party.7 A "substantial relationship" should be understood as a relationship in which it is
possible that the attorney obtained confidential information from the
former client.8 This reading of the test may be inferred from the most
frequently cited justification for disqualification under the substantial
relationship test: protection of client confidences, which in turn preserves client trust in the attorney and furthers free communication between client and attorney.9 When the substantial relationship exists,
the court will irrebuttably presume that the attorney received confidential information relevant to the present case.' 0 Evidence describing the
5. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 90 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1937). See generally Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interests: Representation ofInterest Adverse to That of Former Client, 55 B.U. L.
REv. 61 (1975); Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 1243 (1957).
6. In these cases the requirements for disqualification will be high if the client, after full
disclosure, chooses to continue to be represented by the counsel who is the subject of the disqualification motion. Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 293 (6th Cir. 1979) (requirihg "real and substantial harm").
7. This test was enunciated in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp.
265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
8. Aronson, Conflict oInterest, 52 WASH. L. REv. 807, 834 (1977).
9. See, e.g., First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390,396 (7th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Under DR 4-101(B),
[e]xcept when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) Reveal a
confidence or secret of his client. (2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client. (3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of
himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
10. Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976); Government of India
v. Cook Indus., 422 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a id, 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978), and
cases cited therein.
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former counsel's information will not be admitted."
B.

Vicarious Disquaification.

Disqualification is vicarious when a court disqualifies a lawyer because he or she was a member of a firm that previously represented the
adverse party or when a court disqualifies a firm because one of its
members previously represented the adverse party. The Code of Professional Responsibility endorses the concept of vicarious disqualification in DR 5-105(D): "If a lawyer is required to decline employment or
to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner,
or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may
accept or continue such employment."' 2 The chief justification for this
rule is that lawyers in the same firm have strong professional, pecuniary, and personal reasons for talking to each other about cases. 13 These
reasons are thought to be sufficient to extend the applicability of vicarito attorneys sharing office space' 4 and to student
ous disqualification
5
law clerks.1
In the view of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, DR 5-105 extends disqualification to the firm without imputing the attorney's knowledge to the firm.16 The courts, however,
have generally followed the seminal 1955 case, Laskey Bros. of West
Virginia, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,17 basing vicarious disqualification on an irrebuttable presumption of transfer of information from the
attorney to the firm of which he or she is then a member. If, however, a
vicariously disqualified partner leaves the firm and joins another, the
presumption is rebuttable, and his or her new partners will not necessarily be disqualified. "[T]hey need show only that the vicariously disqualified partner's knowledge was imputed, not actual."'U
This second stage rebuttability of the imputation of confidential
information lessens the rigors of the vicarious disqualification doctrine.
Recent decisions have restricted the doctrine further. Despite the unequivocal language of DR 5-105, the United States district court in Sil11. It is argued that permitting evidence on this question would defeat the purpose of preservation of confidences and trusts. Government of India v. Cook Indus., 422 F. Supp. at 1060.
12. DR 5-105(D). See also OPINIONS No. 342, at 1 (1975).
13. OPINIONS No. 342, at I n.2 (1975).
14. See OPINIONS No. 104, at 356-57 (1934).

15. See, e.g., American Roller Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1975). See also A.B.A.
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS No. 1092 (1968); H,DRINKER, supra note
4, at 107.
16. OPINIONS No. 342, at 8 n.25 (1975).
17. 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956).
18. American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971).
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ver ChryslerPlymouth v. ChryslerMotors Corp.19 declined to disqualify
an attorney who, as a young associate with another firm, had played a
minor role in the tainting litigation. The court rejected the Laskey doctrine of irrebuttably imputed knowledge within the firm by refusing to
impute to the lawyer his former colleagues' knowledge. "The law must
reject defendants' suggestion that for purposes of disqualification, in an
with
organization as large as Kelley Drye, every associate is charged
20
flrm2"
the
in
lawyer
every
the knowledge of the confidences of
In affirming Silver Chrysler, the Second Circuit emphasized two
reasons for limiting vicarious disqualification: the right to counsel of
one's choice and the importance of retaining mobility for lawyers
whose careers start in large firms. Concern for the right to choose
counsel is a factor in nearly all decisions denying disqualification motions. "Motions to disqualify opposing counsel are disfavored. Disqualification has a serious and immediate adverse effect by denying the
client his choice of counsel."'2 ' Several authorities have recognized that
the effect of rigorous vicarious disqualification on the right to choice of
counsel is particularly serious when the available choices are otherwise
restricted, as they may be in a specialized legal field.22 Similar restricted supply problems may arise in isolated geographical areas for
indigent clients23 and, in effect, for clients with long-established relationships with a particular counsel.
There also seems to be increasing judicial sensitivity to the career
problems vicarious disqualification can cause for attorneys, especially
attorneys who start their careers with large firms or with the government and become specialists. 24 The Court of Claims, for example, has
expressed a desire to avoid vicarious disqualification rules that cause
the government lawyer to "infect all the members of any firm he join[s]
with all his own personal disqualifications," so that he or she "take[s]
19. 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), a'd,518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
20. 370 F. Supp. at 587.
21. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 722, 724
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); see Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979).
22. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see Emel
Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 574-75 (2d Cir. 1973) (disqualification allowed despite recognition of problems of access to counsel specializing in patent law). See also OPINMONs No. 342,
at 4-5 (1975); Note, Disqualificationof 4ttorneys/orRepresentingInterests Adverse to Former Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917 (1955).
23. See Aronson, supra note 8, at 856-57.
24. Compare Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954), with Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d
Cir. 1975). See general, OPINIONs No. 342, at 10-12 (1975); Note, The Second CircuitandAttorney
Disqualoffcation-Silver Chrysler Steers in a New Direction, 44 FopDHAm L. REv. 130 (1975).

The argument against vicarious disqualification premised on lawyer mobility is set forth in a
frequently cited Yale Law Journalnote, Note, supra note 22, at 928.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

1314

[Vol. 1979:1310

[is] reduced to sole practice under
on the status of a Typhoid Mary, and
'25
conditions.
the most unfavorable
Some courts have also recognized that rigorous vicarious disqualification can pose monumental problems for the day-to-day functioning
of large firms. Since such firms "represent the largest corporations with
interests in all sectors of the economy, it is almost impossible to have an
important client or its subsidiary avoid some kind of legal relationship
with another client at some time."'2 6 It is for just this reason, of course,
that large firms are the targets of so many motions to disqualify for
conflict of interest. The district court in Silver Chrysler took the position that "[a]ntitrust implications in unduly restricting the work of the
largest law firms' former associates are not insubstantial since these
firms have as clients corporations that control a major share of the
firms may not protect their clients by
American economy. Large law
'2 7
monopolizing young talent.
These concerns have led to a moderation in the judicial view of
vicarious disqualification.
[R]ecent prevailing legal precedent has rejected the harsh, hard-line
approach of irrebuttably imputing confidential disclosures, actual or
presumed, received by one member of a law firm to all members of
that law firm in favor of the more realistically equitable logic, atlegal practices common to emerging law firms
tuned to contemporary
28
of substantial size.

Rigorous vicarious disqualification based on literal interpretation of
DR 5-105(D) will most probably continue to decline. When necessary
the direct conflict of interest will be "screened" from
the lawyer with
29
case.
the later
25. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977). The special problems of
vicarious disqualification of former government lawyers have given rise to a lively debate as to
whether DR 5-105(D) is to be liberally applied to the former governments lawyer's new firm. See
Note, Ethical Problemsfor the Law Firm of a Former Government Attorney: Firm or Individual
Disqualfication, 1977 DUKE L.J. 512; Commentary, The DisqualicationDilemma: DR 5-105(D)
ofthe Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 56 NEB. L. REv. 692 (1977).
26. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 588
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), a'd,518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
27. 370 F. Supp. at 591 (citations omitted).
28. City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 210 (N.D.
Ohio), a'd,573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977). A decision that runs counter to the prevailing trend, by
asserting that the size of the firm is irrelevant, is Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
580 F.2d 1311, 1318 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,439 U.S. 955 (1978). For a general discussion of the
relation of firm size to disqualification, see Liebman, supra note 2, at 1017-18.
29. See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977); OPINIoNs No. 342, at 11
(1975). But see Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting the sufficiency of
screening where government lawyer might be tempted to conduct case so as to enhance future
private employment), rehearingen banegranted,No. 79-7042 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 1979). The petition
for an en banc rehearing of the Armstrong case was supported by an amicus curiae brief by former
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C. The Appearance of Impropriety.
The trend away from strict vicarious disqualification is parallel to,
and in part the result of, a trend away from the strictest possible interpretation and application of the Ninth Canon of the Code: "A lawyer
should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety." After
the adoption of the Code in 1969,30 judicial decisions on disqualification frequently discussed the appearance of impropriety issue. 3' The
lack of confidence in the legal profession that followed Watergate un32
doubtedly spurred interest in Canon Nine.

The appearance of impropriety is a consideration that worked in
tandem with the "transmission of confidences" analysis in prior representation disqualification cases. It helped justify, for example, the irrebuttability of the presumption that confidences passed from client to
attorney. 33 In addition, because of appearance of impropriety considerations, courts have ordered disqualification despite an original in34
formed acquiescence in the choice of the opposing counsel.

There can be no doubt that Canon Nine remains an important
factor in disqualification cases, but recent decisions have shown a tendency to require more than a bare appearance of impropriety. Thus,
one district court held that "[tihe possibility that an attorney's represensenior government lawyers. See Lawyers: Ease Conflicts Ruling, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 12, 1979, at 4,
col. 4.
30. CODE ii.
31. See Note, Ethical ConsiderationsWhen an Attorney Opposes a Former Client: The Need
for a RealisticApplication of Canon Nine, 52 CH.-KENT L. REv. 525, 530-38 (1975), and cases
cited therein.
32. See id. at 537, and authorities cited therein.
33. See Liebman, supra note 2, at 1001; Note, supra note 22, at 920-21, and authorities cited
therein.
34. W. E. Bassett Co. v. H. C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1961), a 'dper curiam,
302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Note, UnchangingRules in ChangingTimes: The Cannonsof
Ethics and Intra-FirmConflicts ofInterest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1062-63 (1964). The appearance of
impropriety consideration has also given rise to some strong judicial language requiring disqualification: "[A]n attorney may be required to withdraw from a case where there exists even an appearance of a conflict of interest," Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 709 (7th Cir.
1976); "[1]n the disqualification situation, any doubt is to be resolved in favor of disqualification,"
Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975). The court further noted
The preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration ofjustice and in
the ihtegrity of the b ar is paramount. Recognizably important are [plaintiffs] right to
counsel of her choice and the consideration of ... judicial economy .... These considerations must yield, however, to considerations of ethics which run to the very integrity of our judicial process.
Id. at 572. The conflict of interest in this latter case was dramatic. Plaintiff's lawyer sought to
represent as intervening plaintiff one of defendant's in-house lawyers, who had been active in the
defense of the case before the court (involving sex discrimination). There was evidence of actual
transmission of confidential information. Therefore the "appearance of impropriety" approach
was adopted more out of an abundance of judicial caution than out of necessity.
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tation in a given case may give rise to an 'appearance of impropriety' is
not enough to disqualify. Specific facts must point to a marked danger
that the perceived evil. . . will result. ' 35 Likewise, the Second Circuit
held that "when there is no claim that the trial will be tainted, appearance of impropriety is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a
disqualification order except in the rarest cases."' 36 The Silver Chrysler
district court maintained that hasty disqualification solely on the basis
of appearance of impropriety charges will itself tend to undermine the
37
confidence in the legal system that Canon Nine is intended to foster.
It would be easy to overstate both the "Watergate" trend towards
increasing reliance on Canon Nine and the more recent trend in the
other direction. 38 There has undoubtedly been a greater change in language than in the way cases will be decided. It does seem, however,
that courts are now doctrinally prepared to deny tactical disqualification motions that are based only on a speculative assertion of the appearance of impropriety.
D. Conclusions on the Law of Disqualification.
For purposes of a discussion of the ethics of moving to disqualify
opposing counsel, a key question is how often a motion will result in a
disqualification when thete should have been none. It is clear that a
technical Code violation will no longer invariably result in disqualification. 39 Courts have become sensitive to the tactical abuse of motions to
disqualify. As the Fifth Circuit has observed, "[i]nasmuch as attempts
to disqualify opposing counsel are becoming increasingly frequent, we
cannot permit Canon 9 to be manipulated for strategic advantage on
the account of an impropriety which exists only in the minds of imaginative lawyers."' 4° In a dramatic recent development, a district court
went so far as to require that moving attorneys pay lawyer's fees under
35. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 722, 724
(E.D.N.Y. 1979).
36. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979).

37. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 589
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
38. It has been suggested that Silver Chrysler, which expressed a concern to avoid an "excess

of ethical fervor," 370 F. Supp. at 591, in disqualifying in terms of Canon Nine, stood in isolated
opposition to the trend toward more aggressive application of the Canon. Note, supra note 31, at
536-37. From the vantage point of 1979, it appears more accurate to say that Silver Chrysler was
the beginning of a continuing trend limiting the doctrine that a mere appearance of impropriety is
sufficient to disqualify an attorney in a prior representation case.
39. Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 991 (8th Cir.
1978).
40. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 819 (5th Cir. 1976). See also OPINIONS
No. 342, at 4-5 (1975).
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28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976)4 1 when it found their disqualification motion
to be "patently frivolous," and intended to "harass" and "delay." 42
Unjustified disqualifications will surely continue. Nevertheless, there is
reason to believe that their number will be held down by increasing
judicial reluctance to disqualify when the conflict of interest is marginal and the movant's motivation is tactical.
II.

THE ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The ethically difficult decision of whether or not to move to disqualify opposing counsel arises when there is a very small probability
of significant harm or a significant probability of a very small harm to
one's client if opposing counsel is not disqualified. In these cases the
movant has a small "expected utility" 43 gain in making the motion.
Typically, the cost for the adverse party will be considerably greater in
terms of choice of counsel and the necessity for repetition of at least
some of counsel's preparatory labors. 44 The hard cases, then, are those
in which the motion to disqualify is not totally frivolous, but the benefit
it will yield by removing the conflict of interest is small relative to the
harm it inflicts upon the adverse party apartfrom the loss of any conflict of interest advantage. In short, the hard case is one in which, from
a neutral viewpoint, there should be no disqualification but in which
disqualification would modestly serve the interest of one's client.
A.

The Obligation to Move to Disqualify.

One appealingly simple solution to the ethical problem is to say
that one has a duty to move to disqualify opposing counsel whenever
there is a nontrivial possibility of a conflict of interest. The existence of
such a duty may arise from DR 1-103(A): "A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 shall report such
knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or
act upon such violation. '45 DR 1-102 is violated whenever there is a
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976) provides: "Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct
cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings
in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally such excess costs."
42. North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 83 F.R.D. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
43. Expected utility equals utility multipled by the probability of that utility's being realized.
44. Some or all of the disqualified attorney's work product may be judicially denied to the
new counsel for fear of transmission of tainted information. First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First
Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1978).
45. Some states in adopting DR 1-103(A) changed "shall" to "should"--apparently to
weaken the obligation. Others have deleted DR 1-103(A). See Note, The Lawyer's Duty to Report
ProfessionalMisconduct, 20 ARIZ. L. REv. 509, 511 (1979).
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violation of any other disciplinary rule.46 A conflict of interest of the
type considered by this Comment will presumably violate either DR 4101(B) 47 or DR 5-105,48 at least as interpreted in the light of Canon
Nine. 49
There is an argument, then, that the Code requires that any possible conflict of interest be reported to the court in some fashion. Courts
have recognized the existence of such an obligation. The Fifth Circuit,
for example, has held that "[w]hen an attorney discovers a possible ethical violation concerning a matter before a court, he is not only authorized but is in fact obligated to bring the problem to that court's
attention. ' 50 A district court has also asserted that the proper way to
bring opposing counsel's conflict of interest to the court's attention is by
a motion to disqualify.51 If these two claims are correct, the ethical
problem is solved with the addition of one further premise: one is obligated to do what the Code commands.
The first point at which this argument is vulnerable is its interpretation of the Code. It seems clear enough that the Code does assert that
there is an obligation to inform the relevant tribunal whenever one
knows that there is a conflict of interest. What if one only suspects that
there may be a conflict or believes that a conflict will probably develop
in the future?
An Informal Opinion of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility is relevant to this question. The inquiry to the
Committee concerned the propriety of moving to disqualify the firm of
an opposing attorney A who would probably be required to testify in a
contract action. The Committee concluded, "you do have a right, although not necessarily an obligation, to attempt to disqualify the...
46. DR 1-102(A)(1) provides: "A lawyer shall not: Violate a Disciplinary Rule."
47. For the text of DR 4-101(B), see note 9 supra.

48. DR 5-105 provides in pertinent part:
Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interest of Another Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer.

(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent

professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by
the acceptance of the proferred employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in

representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(D)

If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment

under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with
him or his firm, may accept or continue such employment.
49. See generally Note, supra note 31.
50. In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1976). See also In re Grand Jury, 446 F.

Supp. 1132 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 345 F. Supp. 93,
98 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
51. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 376 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
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firm."' 52 The Committee prefaced this conclusion with the somewhat
puzzling explanation that "[w]hether or not A and his firm should be
disqualified from representing the defendant in the litigation if A testifies is a matter to be decided by the court before whom the case is
pending. We, accordingly do not think that the provisions of DR 1-102
53
and DR 1-103 are applicable.
It is possible, but unlikely, that the Committee intended to say that
there is never a duty to move to disqualify--since whether or not counsel should be disqualified is ultimately "a matter to be decided by the
court before whom the case is pending. 5 4 More likely, the Committee
felt that in the case of a witness-counsel problem, the court will automatically become aware of the conflict at the time it becomes an actual
conflict. When a report would at most apprise the court of the conflict
sooner, the report may be ethically optional.
In any event, it seems safe to reach the following conclusions from
the Code and Informal Opinion No. 1379. First, the Code does recognize a right to move to disqualify opposing counsel when there is a
nontrivial possibility of conflict of interest. Second, there is a duty to
inform the court in some manner when one knows that there is a conflict of which the court might not otherwise learn. Third, there is probably a duty to inform the court when one believes that there is or may
develop a conflict about which the court might not otherwise learn.
Having determined that there is sometimes a duty to inform the
court of a possible conflict of interest, the question remains whether the
filing of a motion to disqualify opposing counsel is the only proper way
to convey this information. Surely the answer is in the negative. Channels of communications with the court are not so limited. A conscientious attorney who is eager to move the proceedings along quickly will
inform the court of a conflict of interest and waive objection to it. 55 So,
despite some ill-considered judicial language, 56 such a motion is at
most a proper way to inform the court of a conflict of interest, not the
proper way.
Thus, while DR 1-103 does not establish a duty to move to disqualify opposing counsel, the Code does recognize such a motion as
ethically permissible. Is the Code correct about this? Is there always a
52. INFORMAL OPINIONS, supra note 15, No. 1379, at 3 (1976).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. The court can disqualify counsel sua sponte despite the waiver if it views the conflict as
sufficiently serious. See Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1057, 1059-60 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
56. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 376 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
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right to move to disqualify when the motion would be nonfrivolous?
One thing is clear: the Code would subject no lawyer to discipline for
so moving. No Disciplinary Rule would be violated-at least not if the
rules are enforced as the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility seems to understand them. That would settle the question
for a "legal realist" for whom "X is ethical" means "no one will be
disciplined for doing X." This is not, however, the position of the
Code, which recognizes ethical ideals, typified by the "Ethical Considerations," as well as the minimum requirements of the Disciplinary
Rules. In some cases motions to disqualify may be permissible under
the Disciplinary Rules but impermissible in the more full-bodied ethics
of an ethically sensitive practitioner.
In fact, even if the Disciplinary Rules announced a duty to move
to disqualify in the "hard cases," it might, nonetheless, be impermissible to file the motion. It is quite conceivable that the Code is inconsistent with legal ethics at a given point, despite the authoritative bodies
that stand behind the Code.57 The drafters of any sort of code will
sometimes make mistakes. Cases arise that were unforeseen. When the
Disciplinary Rules require conduct that seems clearly unethical to most
practitioners, then the Rules simply do not constitute the content of
legal ethics on that point. To think otherwise is to take a formalistic
approach that is hopelessly removed from legal ethics as it actually
functions within the practice of law. DR 1-103, then, however it may
be interpreted, cannot by itself settle the ethical status of motions to
disqualify opposing counsel in those cases in which the expected injury
from the conflict of interest is small relative to the hardship disqualification will cause the opposing party.
B.

NonrelationalEthics.

Traditional philosophical theories of ethics contain a fundamental
premise that every human being is of equal moral dignity. From this it
follows that what is morally permissible (or obligatory) to do to A is
morally permissible (or obligatory) to do to B, unless there is some
morally relevant difference between A and B. The basic premise may
be illustrated by looking to its consequences for particular normative
ethical theories. In the utilitarian calculus for maximizing total human
happiness, for example, the happiness of any person counts as much as
57. Drafted by the A.B.A. Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethics Standards, the Code
and its amendments have been adopted by the House of Delegates of the A.B.A. See CODE i-ii. It

has also been adopted by the legislature or the court system of every state except California. The
Code's continuing authority is called into question by the existence of a committee to draft a new
Code.
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that of any other person in determining what is morally required.
Thus, if the thousand dollars in A's bank account would produce more
happiness if sent to a starving family in an underdeveloped country, A
will be morally obligated to send it off, other things being equal.
At the greatest level of abstraction, a utilitarian would think it
morally impermissible to move to disqualify in the ethically "hard"
cases. In these cases theharm done the adverse party will, by hypothesis, outweigh the benefit to one's client. It is immaterial from the utilitarian perspective who bears the injuries. The point is to minimize
them. Utilitarians, however, like other traditional moral theorists, recognize exceptions to the rule that everyone is to be treated in the same
way. There are morally relevant differences among people. For example, if A makes a promise to B but not to C, A will have obligations to
B that A does not have to C.58

A moral philosophy denying that such relations as parent-child,
promisor-promisee, or lawyer-client ever make a moral difference can
be called a "nonrelational" ethics. Such an ethics, in its full generality,
is extremely radical, and has probably never been espoused by any-

one.5 9 For the purposes of this Comment, all that must be considered is

the possiblity of "nonrelational" legal ethics, in that they deny that the
relation between lawyer and client creates an ethical reason for the lawyer to prefer the client's interest to that of the adverse party.
Nonrelational legal ethics, in this sense, provide an easy answer to
the "hard cases." One is not permitted to move to disqualify. This
system not only provides an easy and unambiguous answer, but it is an
answer with a certain intuitive appeal. After all, one's clients are no
better than anyone else-or if they are it is by accident. Why should
they be accorded a special place in the moral universe? The answer is
that clients do not have a special place in the moral universe, but they
do in the moral universe of their attorney. They have a special place
because the attorney has undertaken to create a special relationship
with them. That this relationship makes a difference within legal ethics
has systematic as well as intuitive support. Just as the institution of
promising could not exist unless promisees were sometimes treated differently from the rest of humanity, the institution of legal representation could not exist unless clients were sometimes treated differently
from nonclients. Legal ethics is not and could not be simultaneously
nonrelational and appropriate to any legal system remotely resembling
58. For the utilitarian these obligations arise because the institution of promising is useful. It
tends to lead to greater happiness by enabling people to coordinate their affairs.
59. For a philosophy of legal ethics influenced by a form of non-relationalism, see Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals.- Some MoralIssues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1975).
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ours. Under strictly nonrelational legal ethics, the lawyer would be
under no more duty to write a brief for the client than for the adverse
party. For these reasons, strictly nonrelational ethics are implausible,
and it would be unwise to turn to them for help in determining the
legal ethics of moving to disqualify opposing counsel for conflict of
interest.
C.

Strongly Client-CenteredEthics.

Since nonrelational legal ethics are so clearly wrong, the opposite
hypothesis comes to mind: perhaps the lawyer must favor the client's
interest above the interest of all nonclients under all circumstanceshowever small the benefit to the client and however great the harm to
the nonclient. The classic statement of the position is Lord
Brougham's:
Every one knows that the ties between advocate and client are of the
most sacred nature. It is the duty of an advocate to save his client by
all expedient means, to protect him at all hazards, and to the injury
of all others, and of himself among those others, if it be necessary.
He must not hesitate at the pain he may inflict,60 or at the destruction
he may cause in the prosecution of that duty.
Strongly client-centered ethics provide that a lawful action that
benefits the client more than any alternative action is ethically obligatory. Such ethics provide an answer to the "hard questions" of moving
to disqualify opposing counsel as easily as do nonrelational ethics. But
the answer is, of course, just the opposite. Strongly client-centered ethics require that the motion be made.
Just as there is most probably no one who argues for a nonrelational legal ethics, there may be no one who goes to the limit with a
strongly client-centered ethics. 61 But in the case of client-centered eth60. 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 5-6 (1821).
61. DR 7-101 requires client-centered conduct subject to some broad exceptions:
(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules, except as provided by DR 7-101(B). A lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule,
however, by ...

avoiding offensive tactics ....

(B) In his representation of a client, a lawyer may:
(1) Where permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to
assert a right or position of his client.
(2) Refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be unlawful,
even though there is some support for an argument that the conduct is
legal.
The Disciplinary Rules exception of DR 7-101(A)(l) presumably covers frivolous disqualification motions since conduct that would "serve merely to harass or maliciously injur another" is
forbidden by DR 7-102(A)(l).
The "avoiding offensive tactics" language of DR 7-10l(A)(l) or, possibly, the "professional
judgment" language of DR 7-101(B)(1) arguably except the ethically harder disqualification cases
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ics there are both practitioners and academic theorists who are very
close to the full position.62 For this reason the position deserves close
attention.
1. The Conventional Justfication. The justification almost uni-

is
versally given by the proponents of strongly client-centered ethics 63
ethics.
such
requires
system
adversary
the
of
that the internal logic
For this justification of strongly client-centered ethics to succeed, three
propositions must be true: (1) the adversary system promotes important values; (2) those values are not as effectively promoted by any legal
ethics other than strongly client-centered ethics; and (3) the values promoted by the adversary system take precedence over all competing values.
The first proposition is easily granted. Historical experience sug64
gests that the adversary system is a good means for promoting justice
and the acceptance of the legal system. It provides a fairly effective
way of uncovering factual truth, subject to certain limits, and of ascertaining and developing the law. When functioning properly it provides
the parties with the psychological assurance that their interests are
taken seriously and are given every chance to prevail, compatible with
providing the same chance to the other side. By taking the parties and
their cases seriously, the system recognizes and promotes a sense of the
fundamental dignity of the person. If there are better means of accomplishing these ends, they remain to be demonstrated.
The second proposition, that strongly client-centered ethics maximize the values of the adversary system, is more controversial.
Strongly client-centered ethics do strengthen the psychological effects
of the system by encouraging the parties to feel that their interests are
being taken seriously. They permit the strongest possible identification
of client with lawyer because they place the fewest limits on the lawyer's loyalty to the client's position. On the other hand, a well-known
problem is that client-centered ethics pursued to their limits may promote less, not more, truth,65 thus inhibiting justice. Strongly client-cenfrom the scope of DR 7-101(A)'s obligation exclusively to pursue the client's interests. Moreover,

the Code taken in its entirety certainly does not suggest an exclusively client-centered ethics.
Strongly client-centered ethics are not simply zealous in pursuing the client's interest. They are
hyperzealous in permitting the pursuit if nothing else. Since this is contrary to the spirit of the
Code, its justification must be sought elsewhere.
62.

See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).

63. Id. 2-10.
64. For a general discussion of the justice related values asserted to be associated with the

adversary system, see Golding, On the Adversary System and Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL LAW 98
(R. Bronaugh ed. 1978).
65. Strong attacks on the adversary system as a truth producer are found in J. FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL (1963) and Frankel, The Searchfor Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
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tered ethics sometimes require the presentation of known perjury, 66 the
nondisclosure of relevant facts or law, and the making of dilatory motions, all practices inimical to the production of truth. Even the appearance of justice may be undermined, for while most clients feel that
client-centered ethics on the part of their lawyer produce justice, they
are likely to have very different feelings about client-centered conduct
on the part of the opposing counsel. 67 Thus, strongly client-centered
ethics increase the belief that the outcome of litigation is controlled by
the manipulation of technicalities rather than the merits. It is, therefore, by no means clear that such ethics are maximally effective in promoting the values that the adversary system is designed to secure.
Harder still to grant is the third proposition, that the values associated with the adversary system take precedence over all competing values. Justice and the perception of justice in the resolution of legal
disputes are surely important, but so are many other values. We
would, for example, presumably be unwilling to buy a small increase in
justice if the price were a tripling of the size and expense of the legal
system. To take a second example, it is at least not an obvious violation of the values that the adversary system is supposed to promote to
inject a nonparty witness with a truth serum. This practice might well
be productive of truth, justice, and the assurance that one's case will be
taken seriously. Presumably, however, it must nonetheless be ruled out
as an impermissible invasion of the person of the witness.
Legal ethics must be congruent with values arising outside the adversary system.68 The adversary system, therefore, does not supply the
REV. 1031 (1975). Criticisms of Frankel's proposals for reform include Freedman, Judge Frankel's
Searchfor Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975), and Uviller, The 4dvocate, the Truth, and
JudicialHackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel'sIdea, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1067 (1975).
66. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 27-42. See also Pye, The Role of Counselin the Suppresslon 0/Truth, 1978 DUKE L.J. 921, and authorities collected therein at 924 n.17.

67. This aspect of the problem is obscured when the context of discussion is criminal justice.
Hyperzealous prosecution is obviously imcompatible with our criminal justice traditions and val-

ues. Thus proponents of strongly client-centered ethics recommend the system only for the defense. See M. FREEDMAN, supranote 62. One-sided hyperzealous criminal jurisprudence may be

justified by the importance of keeping the innocent from being punished and of counterbalancing
the actual and perceived power disparity between the state and the individual. No doubt some

sacrifice in truth and justice is a price worth paying to minimize the punishment of the innocent
and to protect the human dignity of the accused; but there is a countervailing consideration in the
perception of injustice by the prosecutor's "clients," the public.
68. Just as the fundamental question of philosophical jurisprudence is the relation of the law
to morality, so the fundamental question of the jurisprudence of legal ethics is the relation of that
ethics to the wider morality.
A legal ethics in radical conflict with the values of general morality would presumably not be

a correct legal ethics. Positivism is a less plausible hypothesis with respect to legal ethics than it is
with respect to law. But the extent to which general values must infuse legal ethics is far from
clear. Not every conflict between the two systems of values is necessarily fatal. The lawyer can
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axioms from which all questions of legal ethics may be deduced. Even
if the adversary system would be best promoted by client-centered ethics, the correctness of these ethics could not be inferred.
2. An Alternative Justocation. It is not hard to demonstrate the
inadequacy of the standard argument for client-centered ethics. There
is, however, a second argument for client-centered ethics that has received little theoretical attention, though it is closely related to the reason many practitioners are client-centered in their ethical practice. The
key premise of this second argument is that a correct system of legal
ethics must prescribe standards that the legal profession is capable of
meeting. That "ought" entails "can" is philosophically uncontroversial. What is controversial is how the "can" is to be analyzed. A correct ethical system obviously will not require what is logically 69 or
physically impossible. 70 But it is arguable, as well, that a correct ethical
system will not impose obligations that people are incapable of carrying out due to deep-seated psychological incapacity. 7' Many systems of
general ethics recognize this limitation by making a distinction between
two kinds of good actions. An action that is the best action that could
be performed in the situation is obligatory only if it is of a sort that
morally trained but ordinary people could be counted on to perform in
those circumstances a reasonable percentage of the time. On the other
hand, if the best action under the circumstances is of a sort that only
saints or moral heroes could be expected to perform, then it is said to
be "supererogatory." To perform the action is commendable but not
obligatory. 72 An example of an action widely regarded as supererogaalways step outside of his or her role as defined by legal ethics in response to "higher" moral
concerns. By not requiring a complete correspondence between legal ethics and general morality,

it may be possible to make legal ethics simpler, more systematically unified, and thus easier to
learn and employ in common situations.
69. An example of a logically impossible action is the construction of the diagonals of a

circle.
70. An example of a physically impossible action is jumping across the Mississippi River at

St. Louis.
71. A "deep-seated psychological incapacity" for these purposes is one that could not be

overcome by reasonable levels of moral instruction within a period of several years. The causes of
such incapacities may lie in genetic structure, but they may also be social in origin, involving such
matters as the demands of competition and peer pressure.
72. The distinction between what is obligatory or mandatory and what is commendable is
made within ethical systems. It is not a distinction dividing law from ethics. While ethical and

legal obligations differ, obligation is not foreign to ethics. To claim, as does Dean Patterson, that
"ethical rules are only commendatory in nature, whereas legal rules are mandatory," Patterson, 4
PreliminaryRationalizationof the Law ofLegalEthics,57 N.C.L. REv. 519, 519 (1979), is to confuse being "only commendatory" with the absence of official sanctions. That one may not murder

another is morally as well as legally obligatory. We do not commend one another for not having
committed murder yesterday.
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tory is risking one's life to save a stranger.
An ethical system that fails to make this distinction, and makes all
best actions obligatory, is probably too difficult for most people to live
up to, as is Utilitarianism if it requires the average American to send
most of his or her wealth to underdeveloped countries. Since its prescriptions will be violated, there will be a divergence between ethical
theory and practice, which may widen into a disrespect for the ethical
system as a whole. This disrespect, in turn, is likely to lead to a general
breakdown of the system, including those aspects that people would
have followed under other circumstances.
There is a plausible argument, then, that any ethical system that is
too rigorous cannot be a correct ethical system. 73 Ethics is an institution whose purpose is to guide human conduct. Any system incapable
of so doing fails the threshold requirement. If this argument is correct,
then the set of candidate ethics can be described as "psychologically
constrained." What the ethics can demand is limited by what the target
population can be expected to follow.
On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that there is a single
correct system of general ethics whose truth is quite independent of
matters of moral psychology. To suppose that truth is in part a function of our psychological weaknesses does not give the moral law the
transcendent status many traditional theorists have ascribed to it.74 On
these accounts, if we are incapable of living up to the dictates of the
moral law, so much the worse for us!
Fortunately, it is not necessary, for the purposes of this Comment,
to investigate the question of psychological constraint within the context of general ethical theory. The issue can be restricted to the setting
of professional ethics, and within that setting the plausibility of psychologically constrained ethics is especially great. Professional ethics are
practical, working ethics. There is nothing to be gained in having professional ethics that are too difficult to be adhered to. The losses are
inevitable and obvious: cynicism, disillusionment, hypocrisy, and ill
feeling toward the profession on the part of the rest of the population.
These are reasons to believe that professional ethics ought to be psychologically constrained even if general ethics is not. If members of
society, lawyers and laypersons, were in a position to choose whether
legal ethics should be psychologically constrained or not, the desire that
the system be effective would presumably dictate that the choice be
made in favor of psychological constraint. That society would so
73. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE i76-78 (1971).

74. Plato and Kant are representatives of this tradition.
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choose is at least good evidence that a correct legal ethics must be psy75
chologically constrained.
Having concluded that the system must include psychological constraints, the next task is to ascertain the breadth of the constraints. At
one extreme, it might be suggested that lawyers can, as an empirical
matter, follow no ethics but that of self-interest. That would, however,
amount to following no ethics at all. Such a situation would not necessarily mean that law as a profession would deteriorate in the way it
relates to the rest of the world. Enlightened long-term self-interest can
sometimes produce remarkably civil conduct. But it would, under
these circumstances, be better to let the notion of legal ethics fade into
history.
It is a plausible hypothesis that in the present state of society lawyers are, for the most part, able to live up to the demands of a clientcentered ethics, but are generally unable to live up to an ethics that
occasionally requires that the interests of nonclients be preferred to
those of clients.
In contrast to an ethics of self-interest, client-centered ethics have
a distinct content, for client-centered ethics prohibit a good deal of conduct that is at least in the short-run interest of the attorney. This is
particularly true in motion practice, where dilatory motions may increase fees without advancing the interest of the client. Client-centered
ethics forbids this practice, and in so doing demonstrates that it is sufficiently distinguishable from simple self-interest to warrant the name
"ethics."
There are significant advantages that would be derived from the
profession's embracing officially and publicly the client-centered solutions to the hard questions of motions to disqualify opposing counsel.
Ethical norms would not be distant from actual practice. Ethical lawyers would be at no competitive disadvantage against their less scrupulous fellows. Hypocrisy would be minimized. Of course, this solution
requires that the problems of unjustified disqualification and of motions intended to harass the opposing party be dealt with in some way
other than by imposing an obligation on the lawyer to consider the
interests of the adverse party before moving to disqualify opposing
counsel. Statutory or judicial restriction detailing when disqualification can be granted is an obvious means for dealing with the first prob75. Just what is shown by thought experiments in which subject populations make rational

choices among alternative ethical principles is open to debate. Minimally, the principles that
would be chosen have a prima facie claim to being correct-assuming a proper construction of the
experiments. For the most ambitious and well-developed use of this method, see J. RAWLS, supra
note 73.
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lem. If disqualification is restricted to those cases in which it is
genuinely necessary to insure justice, the problem of questionable disqualification motions would presumably recede without requiring any
special ethical self-policing by attorneys. A further advantage would
be superior protection for the parties. That such narrowing is already
underway is suggested by judicial relaxation of the artificial vicarious
disqualification rules and judicial unwillingness to accept strained "appearance of impropriety" reasoning. 76 A judge is in a much better position to watch out for the interest of a party than is opposing counsel.
The problem of harassment and delay by motions that are not expected to succeed could be dealt with by a system of penalties. 77 Delay
direct appeals from orders decould also be prevented by eliminating
78
counsel.
of
nying disqualification
In short, there are ways of dealing with the undesirable effects of
client-centered ethics other than modifying the ethics. The public image of a lawyer, willing to make use of any technical device to the advantage of his or her client, is not such an unattractive one if the
profession structures the technical devices available so that their utilization does not produce serious injustice.
D. Restricted Client-CenteredEthics.
While client-centered ethics may be structured to provide a passable solution to the problems connected with motions to disqualify opposing counsel, there are alternatives that are more desirable. Two of
these more desirable alternatives will be discussed here. Both represent
modifications of the strictly client-centered approach, and both make
use of the same general decisionmaking procedure. Under the first alternative, the main step of the procedure is commendable but not obligatory, while under the second alternative the entire procedure is
obligatory. Examination of the differences between the two alternatives and the grounds for preferring one to the other is best postponed
until after a discussion of their shared general procedure.
76. See notes 19-40 supra and accompanying text.
77. DR 7-102(A)(1) arguably already provides a basis for such sanctions. Strictly speaking,
the penalties would have to be assessed against the client were they to function within a pure
client-centered ethics. However, it is not extravagant cynicism to believe that penalties assessed
against the attorney personally would be an effective deterrent even for fairly consistent clientcentered attorneys. Probably the best way to conceptualize such penalties is to think of them as
building a small exception into client-centered ethics. The exception, enforced by direct judicial
sanctions against the attorney, runs in favor of the adverse party and prohibits filing a meritless
motion. The court in one recent case has assessed attorney's fees, expenses, and costs against the
moving attorney. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
78. Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 295 (6th Cir. 1979).
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1. The Decision Procedure. There are two threshold matters.
First, it is impermissible to move for disqualification when one knows
that there is no conflict of interest or only a benign technical conflict.
This much, though potentially incompatible with strongly client-centered ethics, seems a minimum requirement of fundamental honesty
and is surely embraced by the lawyer's status as an officer of the court.
Second, and for the same reasons, if there is a nontrivial possibility that
there is a genuine conflict of interest of which the court might otherwise
be unaware, there is a duty to inform the court, though not necessarily
80 and
by filing a motion to disqualify.7 9 The admonitions of the Code
8t
the courts to report conflicts of interest reinforce this duty.
With these threshold requirements in mind, we may address the
substance of the proposed decision procedure. Whether there is a duty
to move for disqualification will depend primarily upon a weighing of
the advantage to the client in making the motion against the disadvantage tothe adverse party. 82 The attorney should not make the motion if
the client's advantage in eliminating the adverse party's conflict of interest is very small relative to the adverse party's loss due to factors
other than the loss of the conflict of interest advantage.
The weighing process should then be fine tuned by taking into account factors that militate against filing the motion. The relevant factors are whether the adverse party is deprived of constitutional or other
fundamental rights; whether the conflict of interest will appear to the
public to be merely technical; whether the disqualification would cause
inefficiencies and dislocations in the provision of legal services by forcing firms to adopt an overly cautious attitude toward potential conflicts
of interest; and whether the behavior of the opposing party in the
course of the litigation has been free from technical manipulations and
83
dirty tricks.
79. See text accompanying notes 45-56 supra. Note that this obligation to inform may also
run counter to client-centered ethics. Either because of considerations of time or because one
believes opposing counsel to be less than the best available, one may not want opposing counsel
disqualified even though there is a genuine conflict of interest. Under such circumstances it is in
the client's interest that information not reach the bench on the basis of which the judge might
disqualify opposing counsel sua sponte.
80. DR 1-103. See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
83. The bad behavior of opponents is sometimes cited by practitioners as a reason for ethical
corner cutting. The danger in such arguments is that they encourage a feedback phenomenon and
a steady decline of ethical standards in practice. It is probably neither possible nor desirable to
eliminate the intuition that those who exhibit good behavior deserve better than those who do not.
The correct solutions would seem to be that all opponents receive a floor level of ethical consideration--however far their own behavior falls below that floor-while those who exhibit standards

above the floor be dealt with on at least their own level.
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2. The Procedureas Nonobligatory Ideal. In the first proposed
solution to the problem of when to move to disqualify, only the two
threshold matters are obligatory. The weighing of interests, the heart
of the procedure, is prescribed as an ideal. The ethically robust practitioner will follow it, but it is not obligatory. In this respect the first
solution parallels the Code's distinction between Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules. The threshold principles, like the Disciplinary Rules, are obligatory, and it would be appropriate for them to
be enforced through disciplinary action. The use of the weighing procedure, on the other hand, is not appropriately enforceable. It would,
however, be recommended and praiseworthy, or, as the Code says of
the Ethical Considerations, "aspirational in character . . .[representtoward which every member of the profession
ing] the objectives
'8 4
should strive."
This solution is superior to strictly client-centered ethics in requiring the threshold steps. These steps are essential to a proper operation
of the system, even if nearly all the responsibility for avoiding unjustified disqualifications rests with the court. They further the values of
the adversary system, and it is unlikely that making them obligatory
would be too demanding from the point of view of moral psychology.
The second step, reporting a conflict, will only rarely be contrary to the
movant's interest, while the first, refraining from moving to disqualify
in very weak cases, usually involves, at most, giving up a temporary
delay and harassment device whose long-run tactical advantageousness
is open to serious doubt. These threshold steps then, while desirable,
represent such a small departure from strictly client-centered ethics that
the problem of overrigorousness presumably cannot arise.
The more important stage of the procedure, the weighing of the
client's interest against those of the opposing party, is only recommended. This recommendation is, however, a departure from the strict
client-centered system, since it asserts the desirability of looking to
other interests in addition to the client's. In establishing only an ideal,
rather than an obligation, however, it avoids the problem of excessive
rigorousness. Moral psychology casts doubt on a nonobligatory ideal
only when the ideal is so elevated that no one could be expected to live
up to it, even in part, in any circumstances. The weighing procedure
clearly does not represent such an unapproachable ideal.
For these reasons, the first solution to the issue of moving to disqualify opposing counsel can be expected to work, even given the truth
of the key empirical hypothesis supporting the moral psychological ar84.

CODE

Preliminary Statement.
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gument for client-centered ethics-the hypothesis that an obligation to
take the nonclient's interest into account would be too demanding for
the great majority of lawyers. Moreover, the solution is more attractive
than the strictly client-centered theory in permitting interests other than
the client's to be taken into account when they are especially pressing.
There seems to be no reason, then, not to prefer this solution to that
offered by strictly client-centered ethics.
It is possible, however, that the empirical hypothesis that supports
the moral psychological argument for client-centered ethics is false,
and that a significant proportion of lawyers are capable of taking the
interests of the adverse party and opposing counsel into account in deciding whether to move to disqualify opposing counsel. If this is true, a
second solution is to be preferred over the one just discussed-a solution that departs a little further from strictly client-centered ethics.
3. The Procedure as Obligatory. To make the weighing procedure itself obligatory, as well as the threshold steps, is to require utilization of both the initial balancing and the secondary fine-tuning
procedure. To make this procedure obligatory is to assert not only that
it is a good thing to take nonclient interests into account, but that not to
do so is an ethical failing for which censure is appropriate. Disciplinary measures stronger than informal private censure could be applied,
though they need not be.
This solution is superior to its less demanding brother if the key
empirical hypothesis is false, and a significant number of lawyers are
able to depart from client-centered behavior by engaging in the weighing procedure. It is likely that lawyers are capable of rising above client-centered behavior to this degree, since the weighing procedure is
not itself a very dramatic departure from client-centered conduct. It
does not call for an equal weighing of the interests of client and nonclient. Rather, it prefers the interest of the client unless the interest of
the nonclient is disproprotionately greater, as, for example, when the
adverse party's interest is a matter of constitutional or other fundamental rights, and the client's is not.
There are two reasons for the narrowness of thle departure from
the client-centered system. First, while the "adversary-system argument" for client-centered ethics is unsuccessful, 85 it is not wholly misguided. The adversary system does protect important values, and there
is a close relationship between the adversary system and those ethics
that make the interests of the client central. Too great a departure from
85. See text accompanying notes 63-68 supra.
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client-centeredness would be incompatible with the efficient functioning of that system, and even if replacements of equal or greater value
are possible, they are unlikely to be arrived at short of a careful and
exhaustive rethinking of the entire system of justice. To render the adversary system less adversary in small ways when it collides with other
important values is not to scrap it altogether. To make it less adversary
in larger ways might well be.
Second, even if the major hypothesis of the moral psychology argument is false, and a significant number of lawyers would not find it
too demanding to give nonclient interests priority under certain circumstances, still, experience suggests that the hypothesis is not too far
off base. Overextension of the circumstances under which the attorney
must give priority to the interests of noncients would thus render the
ethical demands too rigorous for the overwhelming majority of practitioners, and the ethics would cease to guide conduct effectively. While
the proposed solution does not depart too far from client-centered ethics, recommendations of the two systems will sometimes diverge.
Under the system proposed here, for example, the lawyer might be required to refuse his or her client's request to disqualify opposing counsel.
It is worth pausing to consider how the attorney would justify this
refusal to the client. No doubt it would help a great deal if the attorney
could point to a requirement in a code of legal ethics. If the provision
were backed by disciplinary sanctions, that might satisfy the client.
The client, however, might well wonder how the code provision itself is
to be justified. So, to isolate the real justification problem, let us imagine an attorney who seeks to justify refusing a client's request in the
absence of a disciplinary rule.
The lawyer might first cite the disproportionate injury to the adverse party. This is, in fact, the heart of the matter, ethically speaking.
The lawyer, however, may anticipate that some clients, having little
charity in their hearts for the opposing party, will be quite unmoved by
this consideration. An argument in terms of the institutional effects of
the ethical requirement will probably be more persuasive. The attorney could explain that the proliferation of disqualification motions
tends to produce delay and to tie up legal resources, thus increasing the
expense while perhaps lowering the quality of legal services. Such dislocations in the legal system obviously run counter to the long-run interest of clients-including the present client.
The astute client might conclude that client-centered ethics justifies the refusal to move to disqualify after all. The purported novelty of
the "restricted client-centered" proposal is merely that it emphasizes
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the client's long-run interest as a consumer of legal services rather than
his or her short-run interest with respect to the present litigation. Having reached this conclusion, the client might well demand to be the
arbiter of the decision as to how his or her short-term and long-term
interests are to be balanced. Client-centered ethics provide no justification for a refusal to allow the client to make a decision when the client
is willing to shoulder the responsibilty for the possiblity that, in the
long run, the decision is a mistake.
Having been driven into the corner by a client who understands
these issues, the lawyer will have to admit that the refusal to move to
disqualify is ultimately justified by the short- and long-term interests of
persons other than the client. That the refusal is probably also in the
long-run interest of the client is a bonus that may or may not mollify
the client and minimize the psychic dissonance of the attorney.
III. CONCLUSION
While changing judicial attitudes toward disqualification of counbe expected to result in fewer wholly unjustifiable disqualifications, there will remain cases in which such disqualifications will take
place, and more numerous cases in which delay and expense will result
from the necessity of disposing of motions that should not have been
made. The responsibility for avoiding these abuses rests squarely on
the potentially moving counsel.
The ethical principles that should be relied upon in deciding
whether or not to move to disqualify opposing counsel represent a
modest departure from strictly client-centered ethics. It is desirable
that the departure be modest because legal ethics, as working ethics, are
properly constrained by those aspects of the social psychology of lawyers that are unchangeable in the short and medium run.
The first and easiest departures are that lawyers must not make
frivolous motions and that they must inform the court of possible conflicts. While it would arguably be in the client's interest to ignore these
rules, compliance will rarely run seriously counter to the client's interests.
The remaining questions as to when it is ethically obligatory, permissible, and impermissible to move to disqualify opposing counsel for
conflict of interest will depend upon just how demanding a set of obligations lawyers can be expected to follow. If a statistically significant
number of lawyers could not follow obligations more demanding than
those of client-centered ethics, then it will be permissible to move to
sel 86 can
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disqualify opposing counsel in the "hard cases"-those cases in which
the elimination of the conflict is a minor matter relative to the losses
imposed upon the adverse party by the loss of counsel. Even under this
hypothesis, however, it would not be obligatory to move to disqualify
opposing counsel in these cases. Professional ethics can have ideals of
conduct even if only a small number of practitioners could live up to
them on a regular basis. The preferred conduct, and the course that
legal ethics should recommend is a weighing procedure that requires
some attention to the interests of the adverse party. This decision procedure is superior to that of client-centered ethics because it gives
proper scope to other values at the point that they take precedence over
the value of attorney loyalty to client.
If a statistically significant group of lawyers could follow obligations significantly more demanding than those of client-centered ethics,
then the weighing procedure should be an ethical obligation rather
than an ethical ideal. It would be ethically impermissible to move to
disqualify if the loss to the adverse party would be disproportionate, or
involve fundamental values. In borderline cases the attorney should
consider the prior conduct of the adverse party, the way the motion
would appear to the public, and whether it would adversely affect the
efficient provision of legal services.
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